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The Comparative Advantages of Family-Owned Businesses
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 4/15/05
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  45 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 90-160 lbs.,
  Shorn, Midwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
   FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$87.66
119.09
100.16
161.77
64.76
47.76
69.65
94.00
228.60
$91.34
136.24
114.78
156.72
67.17
69.10
70.30
110.00
273.44
$91.83
136.80
114.41
155.03
70.30
69.82
68.26
105.00
260.60
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.85
2.96
9.61
4.91
1.79
3.48
1.85
5.90
2.77
1.82
2.75
1.83
6.08
2.60
1.82
Hay
 Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
115.00
62.50
57.50
115.00
62.50
57.50
115.00
62.50
57.50
* No market.
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
approximately 97 percent of the farms in the United States
are family farms (Banker and MacDonald). In addition,
many agricultural input suppliers, marketing and processing
firms, and other agricultural businesses are family-owned
or controlled. Among the food processing and wholesaling
companies that are family-owned or controlled are Archer
Daniels Midland, Campbell Soup, Pilgrim’s Pride, Smith-
field Foods, J. M. Smucker, and Tyson Foods (Boland).
More generally, over 35 percent of the firms included in the
Standard and Poor’s 500 Index are family-held firms
(Anderson and Reeb).
In the past, businesses that are owned and controlled by
families have been commonly perceived as less efficient
and profitable than firms with more dispersed ownership
structures. Financial economists have offered numerous
explanations for why family ownership might result in
poorer firm performance. More recently, however, econo-
mists have begun to provide reasons for why family
ownership may be associated with superior performance.
In family firms, executive management positions are
frequently restricted to family members, thereby signifi-
cantly limiting the labor pool from which qualified candi-
dates can be drawn. The decision to hire only family
members to such positions can preclude hiring more
capable and talented professional managers from outside,
thus placing family firms at a competitive disadvantage
relative to other firms. Research on small private firms has
suggested that the bias of family firms toward hiring family
members for management positions results in poorer
investment decisions and lower profitability. Appointing
family members to senior management positions also can
create resentment on the part of other employees because
skills, merit, and tenure with the organization are over-
looked.
The tendency of family firms to appoint family mem-
bers to executive management positions also can create
problems when executives remain active after they are no
longer qualified or competent to lead the firm. Research
shows that the founders of family firms are often associated
with strong performance early in their careers, but that they
are often more entrenched in their positions and likely to be
characterized by poorer performance in later years.
When ownership and control are held by a concentrated
group of shareholders, as is often the case in family firms,
the firm may not be able to benefit from several important
efficiencies associated with the separation of ownership
and control. These include efficiencies stemming from the
specialization of the risk-bearing and managerial functions
and from the access to additional capital sources.
In addition, when ownership and control are combined,
the owners can sometimes act to benefit themselves at the
expense of the firm. They may divert resources from
investments that would increase future cash flows in order
to enjoy greater current profits or nonpecuniary perquisites.
They also may be willing to sacrifice some of the firm’s
market value to pursue other objectives such as the maximi-
zation of personal utility. In particular, the owners of
family firms can be expected to have their own interests
and concerns, such as firm survival and capital preserva-
tion, that may not be consistent with the interests of the
firm or other investors. They also may expropriate wealth
from the firm through excessive compensation or special
dividends, and they may seek to extract rents from employ-
ees, adversely affecting employee effort and productivity in
the process.
On the other hand, the combined ownership and control
in family firms can be advantageous. The owners of family
firms may identify strongly with the firms and consider
their performance as very important. These owners are apt
to act as stewards of the firms, especially if they have
family members to whom they want to pass their businesses
when they retire or die. Because the owners of family firms
may view the firms as assets for passing onto descendants,
they may be more likely than hired managers to make
efficient investments that will strengthen the long-term
viability of the firms.
Because of the family’s concentrated equity position in
the firm, it has strong economic incentives to monitor the
firm’s performance, and its sustained presence in the firm
and its control of management and director positions
provide it a unique capacity for monitoring the firm and
minimizing agency conflicts between ownership and
management. When the technology of the firm is important,
family members may do a better job of monitoring the firm
because they are more knowledgeable due to the longstand-
ing relationship they have with it. Thus, although the
restricted labor pool for hiring firm executives may in
general create problems, family members may possess
special skills that outsiders do not.
Due to the family’s long-term involvement in the firm,
third parties, such as input suppliers and capital providers,
may deal with the same managers, directors, and policies
for longer periods of time. Thus the family’s reputation can
play an important role. Economists have suggested that
reputational effects provide family managers strong
incentives to improve the performance of the firm and that
extended relationships with financial institutions can result
in lower costs of debt financing.
Ultimately, the question of whether family-held firms
are more or less efficient than other firms is an empirical
one. A recent study of industrial firms (Anderson and
Reeb) concluded that family firms are associated with
significantly better accounting and market performance
than nonfamily firms. A recent Kansas State University
analysis of food companies (Boland) found that family-
owned companies were able to sustain greater rates of
profitability during the 1980–2003 period and suggested
that this result could stem from the ability of family firms
to focus on long-term strategies without frequent turnovers
in leadership.
Jeffrey S. Royer, (402) 472-3108
Professor of Agricultural Economics
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